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Assumptions and constraints

All LS Login specifics are on this page. Other pages refer to its numbers. Most of it comes from the LS Login team's answers. None of it has been checked against LS Login yet, which is what the tests are for.

Assumptions

Taken as true until a test shows otherwise. A1 to A10 are from the LS Login team, 2026-11-03, in our own words.

ID Assumption
A1 Exchange is allowed per client, in the service registration app: a dropdown of flows has a value that includes token exchange.
A2 aud and resource are validated against the client's registered resource indicators (RFC 8707).
A3 The client ID of the exchanging service must be in the subject token's aud, otherwise there's an error. This is the current proxy stack; the new stack, planned for next year, may drop it.
A4 sub is always persistent.
A5 Entitlements come from user info or introspection, computed for the client calling the exchange.
A6 Refresh tokens come with the scope offline_access, and last 31 days for now; configurable per service in the new stack. The LS Login team added on 2026-11-19 that the limit is idle: see A17.
A7 The lifetime is "currently 1 hour", configurable in the new stack. It isn't clear whether this means only exchanged tokens: a login token of Krini's lived 4 hours on 2026-10-20 (our own observation).
A8 Testing against production LS AAI is fine.
A9 A facility is a client's representation in Perun IDM. A resource represents the relationship between that facility and a VO. To get a group entitlement, assign the group to a resource on the service's facility. Krini does this with ECP_CLN:ADMIN. A client that needs admin mapping only needs that one group, not the whole ECP_CLN structure.
A10 To let anyone with a valid LS Login account log in, create a second resource for the Lifescience VO and assign its members group.

Our own assumptions, from no statement at all:

ID Assumption
A11 LS Login checks the signature and expiry of the subject token. The mock doesn't, so the testbed's rules do it for local runs.
A12 The value of TESTBED_REQUIRED_ENTITLEMENT in the template, urn:geant:lifescience-ri.eu:group:elixir:ECP_CLN#aai.lifescience-ri.eu. We derived it from a known entitlement of the same form. ECP_CLN is a configurable example.
A13 The client settings under Client registration, inferred from A1 to A10. We haven't gone through the whole registration app.

From the LS Login team, 2026-11-19, in our own words (#36):

ID Assumption
A14 Resource indicators of type URI, and for now bare client IDs, are added to a client's registration by the operators, by hand.
A15 All test clients have the admin group of ECP_CLN released, except the orchestrator's, so that T3 has one client without it to compare.
A16 Every LS AAI user may use the testbed's services.
A17 Refresh tokens expire 31 days after they're issued, unless used; each refresh returns a new one with another 31 days. An absolute limit on the grant wasn't mentioned.
A18 Refresh tokens rotate: the one used is revoked. Reuse detection is enabled.
A19 aud of an exchanged token holds the values requested with resource or audience, and the client ID of the client calling the exchange.
A20 Users probably can't review the grants they gave a service. They can revoke their tokens themselves. Consent can only be revoked through a support request.
A21 Refresh tokens probably stay valid when the user logs out. Users can have several sessions, and single logout across services isn't implemented.

Constraints

ID Constraint Source
C1 No act or can_act. They're under consideration for the new stack. The LS Login team, 2026-11-03
C2 A service can only exchange a token that names it in aud (A3), and only for targets it has registered (A2). So each client lists its next hops, and proTES's client lists every TES node, by hand. Follows from A2 and A3
C3 The aud rule needs a client ID, whereas RFC 8707 resources are absolute URIs. If LS Login refuses a bare client ID as an indicator, or a token with only a URL in aud can't be exchanged again, chains can't work today. The operators add bare client IDs as indicators by hand, for now (A14). Follows from A2 and A3, to be tested in T1
C4 Because entitlements are computed for the exchanging client (A5), each exchanging client probably needs the group, too, not only the node. A node's token would then show what the gateway's facility releases. Follows from A5, to be tested in T3
C5 Lifetimes can't be set per service, until the new stack. The LS Login team, 2026-11-03
C6 The operator's public documentation has nothing on token exchange or resource indicators, as far as we could find, and nothing on the flows of the registration app. Our reading, 2026-11-03
C7 The testbed is local: no public hosting. LS Login only sees your browser and the testbed's outgoing requests, and the redirect URI is http://localhost:18994/callback. Our choice
C8 Test accounts only, as sessions record their claims. Our choice
C9 FOCA doesn't exchange tokens yet, so the testbed has its own small implementation. FOCA 0.19.0
C10 The new proxy stack may change the aud rule, act and lifetimes. Nothing specific to the current stack should be hard-coded in FOCA or proTES. Follows from A3, A6, A7, C1
C11 No sender-constrained tokens: the discovery document lists neither DPoP nor certificate-bound tokens. A refresh token belongs to the client ID it was issued to, and only that client's authentication proves who redeems it. A public client has no secret, so whoever holds its refresh token can redeem it as that client. What we've seen, 2026-11-13
C12 Users probably can't see a service's grant, and consent can only be revoked through a support request (A20), whereas the operator's privacy page describes a "Revoke consent" button in the profile. Whether revoking consent, or a user revoking their tokens, ends a service's refresh tokens, nobody has said. What public documents say; the LS Login team, 2026-11-19

What we've been unable to do

"Assign groups" in Perun: this project's maintainer could open a facility and create a resource, but the Next button stays greyed out and no groups can be added (seen by 2026-11-03). This is now answered: it takes TrustedFacilityAdmin within the relevant VO, which the VO admins don't grant for this setup; they assign groups on request. See Client registration and T3.

What public documents say

These pages describe Perun and its proxy. They cover several Perun instances, so they may not describe LS Login exactly.

  • Entitlements: in OIDC, request the entitlements scope to receive the values in the entitlements claim at the UserInfo endpoint, as specified by AARC-G069. Other clients of the same issuer got another claim, though: see What we've seen. The testbed's login asks for the scope entitlements, and the node reads both claims (TESTBED_ENTITLEMENT_CLAIMS in Configuration). A group entitlement is released for each group the user is in, if that group is assigned to a resource on the facility of the service.
  • Group entitlement: the value depends on group names, in the form <NAMESPACE>:group:<GROUP>[:<SUBGROUP>*][#<AUTHORITY>], so it changes if a group is renamed or moved.
  • Resource capability: the alternative that doesn't depend on group names. The Entitlements page recommends it for that reason.
  • Facility and Resource: the entities behind A9.
  • Understanding consent pages: users can deselect attributes at login, and withholding entitlements can break access.
  • Perun roles and their rights: lists assigning groups under Trusted facility admin, Resource admin and Resource self service, and not under Facility admin.
  • Terms of Use for Service Providers: apply to services that rely on LS AAI.
  • Privacy: what data does Perun AAI keep about me?: the user's profile has a Consents section, which lists the services a user has granted access to their personal data, with the attributes each one gets, and a Revoke consent button that "immediately withdraws the service's permission to use your personal information". It says nothing about refresh tokens or offline access (C12).
  • The consent page (see above) is about attributes: which ones are released to the service, and which the user may deselect. It says nothing about offline access, or how long a service may act.
  • Nothing we found in the operator's pages (read on 2026-11-03) states lifetimes of refresh tokens, rotation, reuse detection, or what revoking does. For lifetimes, A6 and A7 were all we had until the answers below.
  • The LS Login team's answers of 2026-11-19 on refresh tokens and consent: A17 to A21, C12.

What we've seen

Public discovery documents, read on 2026-11-03, without credentials:

/oidc/ /cas/oidc
Token exchange, refresh token, client credentials, device code listed listed
Auth method none at the token endpoint listed not listed
Scope entitlements listed not listed

The testbed uses https://login.aai.lifescience-ri.eu/oidc/ by default. A page on re-registration names https://login.aai.lifescience-ri.eu/cas/oidc as the issuer for the LS AAI EOSC node, and says other production services still use the standard process. It doesn't say whether this is the new proxy stack, which is a question for the event. Being listed says nothing about what a given client may do.

The /oidc/ document again, on 2026-11-13, for delegated access:

  • Listed: the scope offline_access; the grants refresh_token and token exchange; a revocation endpoint, https://login.aai.lifescience-ri.eu/oidc/revoke; an introspection endpoint; the token endpoint authentication methods client_secret_basic, client_secret_post and none.
  • Not listed: prompt_values_supported, dpop_signing_alg_values_supported, tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens and backchannel_logout_supported. A missing field doesn't prove that a feature is missing, but no standard way of binding tokens to a client instance is advertised (C11).

Entitlements as LS Login released them to other clients of the /oidc/ issuer (read on 2026-11-12 and 2026-11-15, recorded in generic-issues#46): in the claim eduperson_entitlement, not entitlements, and in user info only. The access token carried the scope eduperson_entitlement, but not the values. Which claim the testbed's clients get with the scope entitlements is unknown until T1 and T3 have run, so the node reads both, and trusts them equally. That's only safe if LS Login fills both from Perun's groups, not from attributes of a user's home organisation, which nothing public says. Once T3 has shown which claim the clients get, set TESTBED_ENTITLEMENT_CLAIMS to that one.

A login token of Krini's, seen by us on 2026-10-20: typ was at+jwt, and aud held the client's ID.