Skip to content

Delegated access: consent and lifetime

Conquest runs a workflow for hours or days, long after the user's tokens have expired, and still has to start tasks on their behalf. Asking the user again every hour isn't practical once they've agreed to the whole run. Refreshing without a bounded, explicit grant isn't acceptable either. The Design describes the end state for this. This page takes its six points one by one: what each needs from the identity provider, what we know of LS Login, what the testbed does and shows, and what's open.

What's known of LS Login

What we know of LS Login comes from its team's answers of 2026-11-03 and 2026-11-19, its public discovery document and the operator's public pages, all under Assumptions and constraints, and is cited by number here. None of it has been checked against LS Login yet: the answers are statements, and T4 and T1 are where they get checked. Where we still don't know, it says so.

Summary

Point Needs from the identity provider LS Login Testbed
Consent once A consent page for offline access that names the workflow system and a duration offline_access listed; what the consent page says about it is unknown Requests offline_access at login; never logs users in at the orchestrator
Bounded grant Absolute lifetime per grant, rotation, reuse detection, binding to a confidential client 31 days for all, idle, no absolute limit mentioned; rotation with reuse detection; no sender-constrained tokens Shows rotation and the 31 days' kind; checks binding and reuse detection
Least privilege downstream Short-lived access tokens for one audience, by exchange or refresh 1 hour; aud holds the requested targets and the exchanging client Services keep no refresh token, and pass on access tokens only
User control A list of grants to revoke; a revocation endpoint Revocation endpoint listed; grants not listed for users; consent revoked through support, or with a profile button (sources differ); refresh tokens probably survive logout Revokes, then checks that the refresh fails
New consent only on change Refresh can't widen scope; new targets need new consent Targets come from the client's registration, not from the user Not tested
Delegation in tokens act Not supported Compares the paths, and relies on logs

What it needs. At submission, the user agrees once, on the identity provider's page, to the workflow system acting for them, and for how long. The request for it is offline_access. OpenID Connect Core, section 11 requires consent for it, and prompt=consent with the request, unless "other conditions" allow offline access. Refreshing within the grant asks nothing more.

LS Login. It lists offline_access, and refresh tokens come with it (A6, What we've seen). The operator's pages describe the consent page as a list of attributes released to the service. They say nothing about offline access, or for how long a service may act (What public documents say). Whether the page mentions either, we don't know.

Testbed. login asks for openid entitlements offline_access by default, and sends no prompt parameter. So whether LS Login returns a refresh token without prompt=consent is part of T1, as is what the consent page lists. Consent is then given to tx-test-client, the portal, and not to the orchestrator:

  • The orchestrator's client is registered without the authorization code flow or a redirect URI (Client registration), so the user never sees a page that names it.
  • Its refresh token can only come from an exchange (T4), at the token endpoint, with no user present. If LS Login issues one there, its own policy decides, not a consent the user gave to Conquest.

Open. How to get explicit consent for the workflow system: by naming it as a resource in the portal's login, if LS Login shows that on the consent page, or by a login at the workflow system's own client. Neither is in the testbed.

Bounded grant

What it needs. The refresh token ends at a fixed time, the expected length of the run plus a margin, however often it's used. It rotates at each use, and the reuse of an old one revokes the grant (RFC 9700, section 4.14). Only the workflow system can redeem it, as a confidential client: RFC 6749 already binds a confidential client's refresh token to that client.

LS Login.

  • Lifetime: 31 days, the same for all, and configurable per service only in the new stack (A6, C5). It's idle: each refresh returns a new refresh token that lives another 31 days. An absolute limit on the grant as a whole wasn't mentioned (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19; A17). A lifetime per run, from what the user agreed to, isn't offered.
  • Rotation and reuse detection: both. Each refresh returns a new refresh token, and the one used is revoked; reuse detection is enabled (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19; A18). What reuse ends, the old token only or the whole grant, wasn't said: T4 shows it.
  • Binding: by client authentication only. The discovery document lists client secrets and none, and no DPoP or certificate-bound tokens (C11). A public client's refresh token still belongs to its client ID, but without a secret, whoever holds it can redeem it as that client. So the workflow system must be a confidential client.

Testbed.

  • refresh reports refresh_token_rotated: true if a new refresh token came back, false if the same one did, null if none did. Without a new one, the session keeps the old one, as RFC 6749 allows.
  • T4 compares exp of two refresh tokens, 10 minutes apart, if the tokens are JWTs or introspection shows exp. A fixed exp shows an absolute limit. A moving one shows a sliding window for each token, but doesn't rule out a separate cap on the whole grant: only LS Login can confirm that. The 31 days themselves can't be waited for.
  • T4 tries to redeem the client's refresh token as another client, and to reuse a rotated one.
  • On the mock, none of this is evidence: any client can redeem any refresh token, and nothing rotates or ends (What the mock can't show).

Open. With an idle limit only, nothing at the identity provider ends a grant that's in use: refreshed at least once a month, it goes on. With one lifetime for all, the workflow system can only end the grant earlier by itself: by revoking the refresh token when the run ends or its deadline has passed. That's a duty of Conquest's, not a limit the identity provider enforces.

Least privilege downstream

What it needs. The refresh token never leaves the workflow system. For each step, the workflow system gets a short-lived access token for the one TES or WES that step needs, by exchange (RFC 8693) or by a refresh limited to that target.

LS Login. Exchanged tokens live "currently 1 hour" (A7), and their targets are checked against those registered for the exchanging client (A2). aud then holds the targets requested with resource or audience, and the client ID of the client that asked for the exchange (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19; A19). So an exchanged token isn't limited to the next hop: the service that obtained it would accept it as well, and so would any service that accepts tokens with its own ID among several audiences. T1 shows it live.

Testbed.

  • The services, gateway and orchestrator, exchange the access token they received, once per request, without requested_token_type, so that LS Login picks the type. They forward only the access token, and keep nothing after the request. TESTBED_EXCHANGE_SCOPE sets the scope they ask for. If LS Login returns a refresh token anyway, the report shows it as decoded claims, or "present", and the service drops it.
  • In the session, --as orchestrator plays the part of Conquest's long-running side: T4 redeems the orchestrator's refresh token with --audience @gateway, and calls the gateway with the result.

User control

What it needs. The user can see the grant at the identity provider, and revoke it there. Cancelling the run makes the workflow system revoke it, at the revocation endpoint (RFC 7009).

LS Login. Its discovery document lists https://login.aai.lifescience-ri.eu/oidc/revoke (What we've seen). Users probably can't review the grants they gave a service, but they can revoke their tokens themselves; where, and whether that reaches a service's refresh tokens, wasn't said. Consent can only be revoked through a support request (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19). The operator's privacy page, on the other hand, describes a "Revoke consent" button in the profile (C12), so that's still to be cleared up. Refresh tokens probably stay valid when the user logs out: users can have several sessions, and single logout across services isn't implemented (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19). A run therefore probably doesn't end when the user logs out elsewhere. It ends at expiry, 31 days after the last refresh, or when the workflow system revokes its refresh token; whether a user's own revocation ends it is still open.

Testbed.

  • revoke <name> --as <role> --refresh sends the refresh token to the revocation endpoint. Its ok only means status 200, which RFC 7009 also returns for a token that wasn't valid. What counts is the refresh after it, which must fail: T4.
  • There are no workflows to cancel. Revoking ro-b in T4 stands for it.
  • Revoking doesn't reach access tokens already issued. The services validate access tokens offline, from signature and exp, as FOCA does. A gateway accepts a token issued before the revocation until it expires, up to an hour later (A7). Whether LS Login then refuses to exchange it, or the node's call to user info fails, depends on whether revoking a refresh token also revokes the access tokens issued with it. We don't know.

Open. With no list of grants for users, the workflow system has to give users a way to stop a run and revoke its access, and its docs have to say so.

What it needs. New consent for broader scopes, other services or more sensitive data. Not because time has passed. RFC 6749, section 6 already forbids a refresh from widening the scope.

LS Login. Whether it refuses a refresh with a wider scope, we don't know. The targets a client can exchange for are set in its registration (A2, C2), not by the user: a new TES node becomes reachable when the gateway's registration lists it, without any new consent.

Testbed. No test asks for a wider scope. refresh --scope could, if this needs an answer.

Delegation visible in tokens

What it needs. An act claim (RFC 8693, section 4.1) that names the workflow system as the party acting for the user, set by the identity provider.

LS Login. No act or can_act. Both are under consideration for the new stack (C1).

Testbed. Each service reports act, if a token has one. Instead of act, T5 shows what's left: sub names the user, aud the next service, and client_id, at best, the last caller. Whether Conquest was involved can't be read from a token. Accounting and provenance then rest on the services' logs, and on traceparent, which any hop can reset.

Questions for LS Login

What we asked or tested, and what came of it. Each test's page says what its answer changes.

Question Answer
Are the 31 days idle or absolute? Idle: each refresh gives a new refresh token for another 31 days; an absolute limit wasn't mentioned (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19). T4 to confirm
Do refresh tokens rotate, and is reuse detected? Both are enabled; the used token is revoked at each refresh (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19). Binding to the client, and what reuse ends: T4
Can an exchange return a refresh token, limited to the next hop? Still open: not asked, as T4 answers it
Can exchanged tokens be limited to one audience? No: aud holds the requested targets and the exchanging client (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19). T1 to confirm
Does the consent page mention offline access, and for how long? Still open: T1, by looking
Can users see and revoke a service's refresh tokens? Probably not see; users can revoke their tokens themselves, consent only through a support request (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19). Still open: where users revoke tokens, and whether that or revoking consent ends a service's refresh tokens
Does logging out end refresh tokens? Probably not; single logout across services isn't implemented (the LS Login team, 2026-11-19)